ABSTRACT
Introduction
Due to technological advancement, effective and efficient production is attainable by means of automated manufacturing in order to prevent human errors. However, production systems generally deteriorate due to different manners and terms of usage, which results in unstable production processes. Therefore, an appropriate inspection plan is essential to ensure product quality and reduce the production and the compensatory costs.
In 1975, Wetheril and Chiu proposed an inspection sampling plan that takes into account economic effects [1] . Bisgarrd et al. discussed a case when a failed product could be sold at a discount value [2] . Golhar brought forth a model considering the compensation of failed products sent to customers [3] . Moskowitz and Tang, Fink and Margavio, and Aminzadeh followed the aforementioned concept and established various sampling plans based on Bayesian approach [4] [5] [6] .
The issue of quality level setting for product manufacturing processes has been extensively studied. The quality level setting and aging or deterioration rate of production facility will affect the process yield, which in turn engenders economic effect to the company. Lee and Elsayed and Lee et al. studied a profit maximization problem on quality level setting for filling processes [7, 8] . Hsu et al. studied a multiple lot-sizing decision problem with an interrupted geometric yield [9] . The study describes a manufacturing process of drawing special steel coils. The drawing operation in the process involves a die that gradually becomes worn from use. The output will no longer meet specifications when the die wear is excessive, which implies that the integrated drawing process follows an interrupted geometric (IG) distribution. In such a production environment, selecting a high quality die and a short time replacement policy will result in high process yield; however, such quality setups will in turn be costly.
Yeh et al. considered that the deterioration of a production system can be classified into in-control or out-of-control states, and the elapsed time of the system in an in-control state is exponentially distributed [10] . Ben-Daya and Hariga and Moon et al. both investigated the economic lot scheduling problem with imperfect production processes by assuming the elapsed time shifts from an in-control state to an out-of-control state that is exponentially distributed [11, 12] . Wang and Sheu deter-mined the optimal lot size with an assumption that the deteriorating production system has a geometric survival distribution under a free-repair warranty policy [13] . Wang obtained the optimal lot size by assuming the deteriorating production process has an increasing failure rate with a general shift distribution [14] . Other studies assumed that the number of conforming items in the imperfect production process has the following distributions: discrete uniform [15] , binomial [16] , and interrupted geometric [17] [18] [19] .
This research presents three profit sharing models of a product involving a key item in a two-echelon supply chain process. The upstream supplier determines the quality level and cycle time setting of the key item production, while the downstream producer can select its own inspection sampling plan. It is assumed that the item manufacturing quality meets the interrupted geometric distribution, and inspection errors may occur. Bayesian approach is used to solve the two-echelon benefit problem by incorporating into the models the following factors: the supplier's item quality information, the producer's sampling information, inspection and product failure costs, and inspection accuracy. Finally, an example is provided to illustrate the features and applications of the models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the problem and describes the model; Section 3 presents numerical results of two examples; Section 4 concludes this study.
Problem and Models
In this section, notations used throughout the paper are first introduced. The problem then is illustrated in Sub-Section 2.2 via a diagram. Finally, three profit sharing models and a sampling inspection plan are detailed in subsequent sections.
Notations
x: a process quality level setting, xX.
X: set of possible quality level settings. T: cycle time for resetting the process quality level.
: set of all choices for cycle time T.
S u : selling price per item by supplier. C u : manufacturing cost per item by supplier. C x : setup cost for process quality level x. N: quantity ordered by producer. S d : selling price per item by producer. D 1 : producer's stage 1 decision for sample size n. q 1 : probability of no type I error, a constant. q 2 : probability of no type II error, a constant. P: process yield or probability that an item is good; a random variable.
W: probability of an item being reported "good" during inspection.
Y n : number of reported "defective" items at stage 1; y is the realization.
Z N-n : number of defective items in the remainder of lot. Y N-n : total number of reported "defective" items in the remainder of the lot after full inspection. k 1 : inspection cost per item. k 2 : penalty cost of a failed product sold to customers. M(y): number of inspections to compensate y reported as "defective" to producer.
R(n): number of defectives due to type II error for n reported "good" items.
D 2 : producer's stage 2 decision on the remainder of the lot after observing the sampling outcome; it contains two alternatives: stop inspection (S n ) and continue to inspect the remaining all (C N ).
M(Y N-n ): number of inspections to obtain Y N-n reported "good" items.
M cp (x,T,n): number of items to compensate producer under supplier's setup (x,T) and producer's sampling size n.
Problem Description
Consider a decision problem arising in a two-echelon production process, where the upstream level (or supplier) manufactures a key item and the downstream level (or producer) assembles a product involving this key item. The supplier can select the item production process with a high quality level setup and short cycle time for resetting, but the corresponding total setup cost will be large. On the other hand, if the supplier selects a low quality level with large cycle time, the total setup cost is low, but the risk of returned defective items will be high. Furthermore, for both cases the item quality can be improved if the supplier selects a smaller cycle time of resetting the production process. The problem assumes that the producer bears all inspection cost under its sampling plan, and the supplier undertakes the compensation cost of the returned items. Figure 1 portrays the problem. When the supplier receives a demand request, he schedules the production process and determines the initial quality setup level "x", as well as the cycle time "T" to reset the process. A higher initial quality level setup will incur a higher cost, and such will be the same for a shorter cycle time. On the other hand, the downstream producer can take a two-stage rectifying inspection before sending items to its assembly line. Stage 1 determines the sample size, whereas stage 2 chooses between continuing and stopping the remaining items in the lot after the sampling utcome is observed. It is assumed that the inspection o decision on the sample size n for the purchase lot of size N. Likewise, f 2 (x,T,N,n) is the profit received by the producer under sample size n. Both functions can be expressed as follows.
will be imperfect; that is, both type I and type II errors may occur. The supplier bears the risk of type I error, whereas the producer may suffer a product failure cost from type II error caused by imperfect inspections. Such types I and II probabilities are treated as constants and can be estimated by data and/or according to production management's discretion. In summary, the supplier's cost includes 1) the quality level setup, 2) the number of such setups, and 3) reimbursement for items reported "defective" by the producer. The producer's cost comprises 1) inspection cost for specified sample size n and extra inspections M(Y n ) for compensation of reported "defective" items, 2) product failure cost due to uninspected defective items and/or inspected items with type II error.
where x     is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and represents the number of production setups for this order, and
is the expected number of additional inspections when the producer's sampling size is n. This term includes the extra inspections required to compensate for the reported "defective" items during stage 1 inspection, and the number of reported "defective" items at stage 2 when the stage 2 decision is to continue inspecting the remaining items of the lot (Equation 2).
Clearly, the profit-maximizing objectives of the supplier and the producer will conflict. We consider three models in the next section to resolve this conflict.
Mathematical Models
It is assumed that the qualities of items in the lot and items for compensation are statistically independent, and have a common prior distribution. Furthermore, the sampling information can be applied to calculate the posteriors for both types of items.
Let f 1 (x,T,N,n) denote the profit received by the supplier under its setup decision (x,T), and the producer's is the lo to decision "C N ", and n + E(M(y)|n,y) is the expected total number of inspections to obtain n reported ss due
"good" items given the sampling result (n,y). The producer's optimal sample size n * is the number satisfying quation (3). Clearly, f 2 (x,T,N,n * ) is the expected tio tempts to m E maximum profit that the producer can obtain under quality level setup (x,T).
Model 1: Producer's profit maximization In this model, the producer's profit maximization is a constraint (Equation 4) of the supplier's profit optimizan problem. In other words, the supplier at aximize its profit by selecting a quality setup (x,T) given that the producer has optimized its own expected profit under (x,T).
Model 2: Supplier's profit maximization The supplier's profit is maximized when the ducer's sampling size n is 0; in such a case there w no Model 3: Collaborative strategy for total profit maximization proill be compensation to the producer.
This model permits both parties to negotiate the inspection sampling policy to be execu y the producer. This collaborative strategy will m ted b yield the maxium total profit as the profit conflict between both sides is minimized.
For any quality setup (x,T) and requested quantity N, the following results hold: 1) For Models 1 and 3:
, where n * is the optimal sample size for Model 3. The reason is th izes the combined profit f 1 , whereas
Computation Formulae
The probability that an item is reported as "good" (including type II error) is as follows:
where   p  conform is the prior probability density function of an item ing to quality specification. In our study,
f y ed to be Beta (,). The probability o reported efective" items for n samples is:
Pr | 1 y n y n y n w w p dp y p q E R n n y n p n y dp p q p q
At stage 2, decision "S " is better than "C N " when
After algebraic operations, the inequality is converted to
If there exists an integer c  0 such that for all y > c decision C N is better than S n , the integer c will be referred to as the critical number of sample size n.
2.
y item engenerty:
ctive item is produced, all items follow-T 8)
Process Quality Level Setup and Cycle Time Resetting
In the problem, it is assumed that the ke dered in the production process has the following proponce a defe ing the first defective one will also be defective. Interrupted geometric (IG) distribution meets the item quality for such a production environment. A short time replacement policy of production equipment (resetting) will result in a high process yield; however, the item quality enhancement will be costly when the lot size is large.
For IG, let r x represent the yield of the first item with respect to x quality level setup. Thus, the probability of t non-defective items under cycle time T will be Pr{G = t} = t (1 )
r . Here we assume that each item takes one unit of time to produce.
The a e and variance of yield for cycle time T are as lows:
For a lot size , the process will perfo setups to pro . Let be the number of conf unde tim yield 
Suppose that the supplier only provides the produce with information on the mean and variance of the key item's quality; if the producer selects Beta (,) a pri an r s the or distribution for the output yield, the parameters  d  can be estimated by
Illustrative Example
The As aforementioned, the producer will obtain the mean and variance of the yield regarding the lot of size N. The producer adopts a Beta prior distribution to represent the lot quality and for sampling inspection. Table 1 presents the information on yield, E(P) and Var(P), which are derived from Equations (9), (10) and (11) . This information will in turn be used to estimate the parameters (,) of Beta prior according to Equations (12) and (13). The results indicate that a shorter cycle time T leads to a higher item quality and smaller variance. The resulting Beta prior will then be incorporated with (q 1 ,q 2 ) to calculate "reported good" probability E(W) using equation (7) . Table 2 displays the probabilities of "reported good" for all possible combinations of {r x , T, (q 1 ,q 2 )}. The higher the value of (q 1 ,q 2 ), the larger the probability of "reported good". Table 3 shows the numerical results of the three models when T = 15 and N = 1500 with three different (q 1 , q 2 ) values. The calculation uses the following quality setup costs: C x = 450 for r x = 0.995, and C x = 500 for r x = 0998. Generally, when there are inspection errors, reported defective probability 1-E(W) increases as the value of (q 1 ,q 2 ) decreases. The producer will non aximum profit in Model 1 as its risk of delivering defective products to customers is minimized. However, the supplier will receive minimum benefit if he complies with Model 1. In contrast, the supplier's profit will be maximized in Model 2, since he has no obligation for any defective items sent to the producer. Here, the producer's interest is reduced to the minimum. In Model 3, the benefits of both parties are between Models 1 and 2, but their combined profit is the highest. In the case of T = 15 and N = 1500, the optimal decisions (r x ,n * ,c * ) are (0.995,18,0), (0.998,12,0), (0.998,10, 1) for (q 1 ,q 2 ) = (0.96,0.96), (0.98,0.98) and (1.0,1.0), respectively. It appears that for any model, the profit of either party de- Table 1 . Item quality using inte pted geometric distributions. risk of delivering more failed products to its customers. In practice, the penalty cost of delivering a failed product is regarded as much greater than the unit inspection cost. Another impact of the (q 1 ,q 2 ) decrease is the increased stringency of the inspection sampling plan. The inspection sample size will be enlarged.
A larger setup cost will lead to higher item quality. For the supplier, there is a trade-off between item quality and setup cost/cycle time. Table 4 Table 5 presents additional results of other values C x for r x . When C x = (90, 100) for r x = (0.995, 0.998), the optimal decision is (r x , T) may be more suited when the supplier is an exclusive input source of the key item. Often in practice however, both parties will not completely agree on either Model 1 or Model 2. A compromising solution would involve both parties utilizing Model 3, and the supplier determining the best setup of (C x , T) that leads to the maximum combined profit. Then each party will receive his own share according to the solution. Neve 0) with ofit of and wh = ( wh , the o d a t n is of 126 (0.998 is appr hen the r is a m er negotiation on profit sharing may be needed if one party claims that he contributed more towards the combined profit.
Conclusions
This study discusses a decision-making problem on the profit sharing of a key item in a two-echelon supply chain process. The upstream supplier determines the quality level, as well as the reset cycle time, during the manufacturing process. However, the producer aims to minimize his risk by selecting and implementing an optimal inspection decision. Since the two parties have conflicting interests, three profit sharing models are proe conflict. Model 2 will work solely to the supplier's favor. Model 1 will be useful if the producer's penalty cost of product failure is high. On the other hand, Model 2 is more applicable if the supplier provides high quality key items, or is the dominant source of the key item. These two models tend to be more one-sided, situation-based solutions that lopsidedly favor either the supplier or producer. Model 3 may be the most practical and compromising one, as it requires both parties to work together in obtaining the largest sum of profits, and prevents an unreasonably large gap between their individual profits. This collaborative manufacturing strategy can ensure that both parties receive acceptable returns and maintain long-term business cooperation.
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